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| 'We
Did Exactly What Al-Qaeda Said We Would Do' |
 Against
All Enemies, Richard Clarke's devastating book indicting the
Bush administration's approach to terrorist threats. |
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| 9-11
Lies |
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| Intelligence
Report |
| One
of the most under-reported findings of the joint congressional
inquiry into the suicide hijackings of 9/11, published July
24, is that U.S. intelligence had no evidence that Iraq was
involved in the attacks or that it supported the al-Qaeda terrorist
network that planned and carried them out. |
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| Grover
Norquist Linked to Terrorists |
There's
an incredible story brewing in Washington that is too hot for
the networks to touch.
Grover Norquist, whom most conservatives know as Executive Director
of the College Republicans, boardmember of the NRA, and head
of Americans for Tax Reform, has been exposed as helping Muslim
groups and individuals who finance and support Islamic terrorism
gain access to the Bush White House. |
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| Grover
Norquist: At It Again? |
| Will
Attorney General John Ashcroft indict him this time -- or will
Karl Rove give him a "Get out of Jail Free" card? |
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| GROVER
NORQUIST'S STRANGE ALLIANCE WITH RADICAL ISLAM. |
| They
placed their trust in one of the right's most influential activists:
Grover Norquist. As president of Americans for Tax Reform, Norquist
is best known for his tireless crusades against big government.
But one of Norquist's lesser-known projects over the last few
years has been bringing American Muslims into the Republican
Party. |
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| The
lies of Grover Norquist |
| Gaffney's
article is a tremendous piece of work. It may err in some details,
but it portrays the operations of America's Islamist fifth column
in the Wahhabi lobby with insight and care. Gaffney relies not
only on journalistic sources but also provides his own valuable
eyewitness testimony. His criticism of Norquist in the article
is impersonal and principled. |
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| History |
| |
Complete
911 Timeline
Compiled by Paul Thompson |
| This
webpage is meant to be a comprehensive resource for anyone attempting
to understand 9/11, the anthrax attacks, and the “war on
terrorism.” Once you start reading, I think it will become
clear that there is much more going on than the “official
story” claims. |
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| Complete
911 Timeline |
| Showing
1-50 of 1382 events (use filters to narrow search): |
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| 9-11
Commission |
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TESTIMONY
OF RICHARD A. CLARKE
BEFORE THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES-PDF |
In
retrospect, we know that there was information available to
some in the FBI and CIA
that al Qida operatives had entered the United States. That
information was not shared
with the senior FBI counter-terrorism official (Dale Watson)
or with me, despite the
heightened state of concern in the Counter-terrorism Security
Group. |
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| Commission
exposes details that show attack clues went undetected |
Startling
new details unearthed by the commission this week show that
there were many clues in the spring and summer before the suicide
hijackings. They simply weren't recognized, shared among government
agencies or pieced together.
The threat reports surged even higher in June and July. But
little was done to shore up American defenses. |
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| Transcript:
Sen. Bob Graham on Fox News Sunday |
| GRAHAM:
My colleague, the vice chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee,
Dick Shelby, Republican of Alabama, has estimated that 95 percent
of those 28 pages should be released to the public; that the
reason why they have been withheld has more to do with politics,
international and domestic, than it has to do with national
security. |
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| Threats
and Responses in 2001 Staff Statement No. 10 |
| Although
there was no credible evidence of an attack in the United States,
Clarke told us, the CSG arranged for the CIA to brief senior
intelligence and security officials from the domestic agencies.
The head of counterterrorism at the FBI, Dale Watson, said he
had many discussions about possible attacks with Cofer Black
at the CIA. They had expected an attack on July 4. Watson said
he felt deeply that something was going to happen. But he told
us the threat information was "nebulous." He wished
he had known more. He wished he had had "500 analysts looking
at Usama Bin Ladin threat information instead of two." |
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